Large-scale or small-scale production? The 'Agrarian Question' today

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Grande production ou petite production ? La « question agraire » aujourd'hui.

Abstract.

Having analysed the advantages and disadvantages of large-scale and small-scale farming in 1899 in 'The Agrarian Question', Kautsky considered that the industrialisation of agriculture and the proletarianization of the peasantry were inevitable and constituted a necessary stage in the construction of socialism. Until the end of the 20th century, his predictions were borne out only in countries where the state had forcibly organised the collectivisation of agriculture, and not at all in Western countries. But since the 1970s, and subsequently with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the development of agrarian capitalism and large wage labour enterprises seems inevitable. On the basis of various field studies and by re-examining the concepts we use on a daily basis, it appears that the true superiority of large-scale agricultural production lies not in its efficiency in generating net wealth per unit of area, nor in creating jobs, but in its capacity to capture rents of various kinds. However, the phenomena of land and natural resource appropriation and concentration that we are witnessing pose a global threat to humanity. Re-examining the agrarian question today and rethinking the links between large-scale and small-scale production are therefore priorities, both for research and for social movements.

K**eywords.** Agrarian question – Economic viability – Farm size – Land grabbing – Large-scale and small-scale production – Land rent.

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I shall not address specifically the situation in the Mediterranean countries, which the participants at the FONCIMED seminar know far better than I do. I propose that we reflect on contemporary agrarian dualism based on research conducted in various regions of the world, often by members of AGTER, and identify some central issues which, in my view, should be addressed during our discussions in Tunis.

I – The industrialisation of agriculture, the proletarianization of peasants: was Karl Kautsky right?

The debate over the advantages and disadvantages of large-scale agricultural production and small-scale production is a long-standing one, but it gained considerable significance with the development of capitalism and the emergence of the socialist project. Karl Kautsky's work, 'The Agrarian Question', published in German in 1899, discusses the positions that were then in contention and sets out a proposal for an agrarian policy for German social democracy (Part Two). Only the first part, 'The Development of Agriculture in Capitalist Society' was published a year later in French. For Kautsky, both 'the industrialisation of agriculture' and 'the proletarianization of the peasantry' were inevitable. Starting from a description of developments in the countryside in the countries where capitalism was then most advanced, Kautsky argued that these trends should be reinforced to create the conditions for a subsequent transition to socialism (Kautsky, 1983).

Kautsky's predictions did not happen in the 20th century in the Western countries. Developed countries did indeed experience a sharp decline in the number of people employed in agriculture, but 'family-based' forms of production persisted, and even grew stronger, and these countries did not see the widespread establishment of large capitalist production units employing agricultural labourers. In the few countries that appear to be exceptions, there still exist hidden family farms which are, to a large extent, the driving force behind the process of development and food production, whether in the British colonies or at the heart of the agricultural frontier in Latin America (Merlet and Jamart, 2007).

In the 'Eastern Bloc' countries, by contrast, large-scale production has prevailed. Kautsky's analyses and the policies derived from them were widely put into practice by the socialist regimes in Russia, Eastern Europe, and a few countries in other parts of the world. These transformations were largely imposed by the state, often with great violence. The collectivisation of agriculture (kolkhozes, sovkhozes) became a central element in the construction of 'socialism'. However, tiny smallholder plots were usually retained, and their role in food production remained very significant. Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the various forms of large-scale collectivised production collapsed within just a few years, giving way in most cases to very large capitalist enterprises.

Until the last quarter of the 20th century, the industrialisation of agriculture, the proletarianization of peasants and the replacement of small-scale production by large-scale production had occurred only in socialist countries. Some countries, however, such as China and Vietnam, had undergone spectacular reversals by de-collectivising their rural areas. The consequences there were diametrically opposed to those predicted by Kautsky: the return to small-scale peasant production following land reform led to a spectacular agricultural boom which contributed significantly to the subsequent industrial development of these two countries. Agriculture in the developed Western countries, for its part, had remained family-run, employing very little paid labour. This had not prevented it from becoming increasingly productive.

However, recent developments finally seem to prove Kautsky right. The highly publicised cases of 'land grabs' since 2008 have brought to the attention of the general public phenomena that had begun to emerge as early as the 1970s in certain countries, particularly Brazil. These are developing on a scale and at a pace never before seen, and in fact comprise two distinct processes: 1/ the 'private appropriation' of territories previously managed 'collectively' by indigenous peoples or mixed-heritage populations – also known as 'dispossession' – and 2/ the concentration of land use – on land already under private ownership – in the hands of an ever-smaller number of producers (Merlet and Perdriault, 2010). These phenomena have provoked numerous reactions from human rights and environmental campaigners, but their economic and social consequences have been analysed far less extensively. The media have focused primarily on the despoilment of populations in the Global South and the formation of vast agricultural conglomerates,

rather than on the gradual increase in farm size. Yet the agrarian structures of many developed countries are currently undergoing rapid polarisation, whether in Western Europe or North America. The number of people working in agriculture is falling, whilst the size of commercial production units continues to increase. Even in France, where the policy of agricultural modernisation pursued after the Second World War had successfully developed tools and an original philosophy based on the promotion of two-person family-run production units, we are witnessing an increasingly rapid disappearance of smallholder farming practices and the abandonment of specific policies to support family farms. Corporate forms of agriculture and land ownership are gradually replacing family-based models, resulting in a profound shift in economic and property-related logic, the equating of land with capital, and the circumvention of the mechanisms for regulating land markets that had been put in place after the Second World War (Terres d'Europe SCAFR and FNSAFER, 2015).

At the same time, global threats to humanity are multiplying, with no genuine alternative proposals on the table. Beyond the self-congratulatory statements by international organisations and certain countries regarding the Millennium Development Goals and the fight against poverty and hunger, wealth continues to become increasingly concentrated and inequalities are soaring. Many countries are increasingly living on credit, and global economic crises are becoming ever more frequent. The destruction of biodiversity and climate-related risks are threatening the survival of humanity. The rise in migration flows and the escalation of armed conflicts are, to a large extent, the result of all these phenomena.

The development of Chinese capitalism, as well as that of major projects and extractive industries across the globe – and in particular the revival of mining projects of all kinds by 'progressive' governments in Latin America – has, following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, reduced the 'socialist project' to a mere illusion of the past. In fact, Kautsky's theories are no longer put forward solely by socialists; they are now championed by neo-liberals and major capitalist entrepreneurs: the disappearance of small-scale family farming, deemed 'archaic', is said to be more necessary than ever to enable development, reduce poverty and feed the world's population. Only massive 'investment' would enable its replacement with modern and efficient agriculture.

II – What has changed? How can we account for this and explain the phenomena currently unfolding?

All previous colonial phases, over the course of centuries, had been characterised by the need for a large workforce in order to appropriate the wealth of the conquered countries. Thus, the Spanish and Portuguese had to subjugate the indigenous American populations, then import millions of slaves to replace the native populations decimated by disease and exploitation. They ultimately relied on poor European farmers by organising their migration and the colonisation of the great plains of southern Latin America. Direct violence (wars, forced labour, slavery) thus played an essential role in enabling the dominant groups to secure the labour force without which any process of accumulation would have been impossible. With the massive use of fossil fuels and machinery, and with technological development accelerating considerably, the situation has changed radically (Merlet, 2012).

Today, the 'market society' – a term coined by Karl Polanyi – has become widespread on a global scale, driven by the development of transport and trade. Land, labour and money are treated as genuine commodities, the markets for which are supposedly capable of self-regulation, whereas they are in fact merely 'fictitious' commodities (Polanyi, 1983), which are certainly bought and sold but were not produced for that purpose. Violence still exists, of course, but direct violence is no longer the primary mechanism for mobilising the labour force, nor for the acquisition of land or natural resources. Institutional violence has become widespread, now taking the form of contractual arrangements between individuals, but also involving states, which have become 'sovereign' following decolonisation. The industrial revolution of the 19th century was followed by what might be called a 'financial revolution': the development of the financial sector and the extraordinary growth of fictitious capital relative to capital directly linked to material wealth have significantly altered the dynamics of accumulation.

Many institutions that we regard as indispensable are problematic and give rise to numerous 'perverse' effects. *Contracts, which are* supposed to be entered into voluntarily, often bind parties whose powers are very unequal. The *sovereignty* of states over so-called 'national' lands, where no formal title deeds have been issued, leads certain leaders to sell or grant these lands under concession to investors, even though they have been occupied for generations by communities who are thereby reduced to the status of squatters.

More generally, many of the concepts and categories used today to describe and analyse changes in the agrarian sector are misleading, and few researchers subject them to rigorous critical analysis. The historical failure of 'real socialism' is undoubtedly not conducive to a renewal of thought, even amongst those who are convinced that the current development of capitalism is leading us towards new major crises, which risk being as dramatic as those of the 20th century. New analyses and new proposals are, however, urgently needed! This begins with a 'deconstruction' of many commonly used categories – such as economic efficiency, productivity, investment, and ownership – and will entail a thorough re-examination of certain dogmas, both 'neo-liberal' and 'socialist'. We must clarify the issues at stake and formulate analyses accessible to all, using examples rather than merely increasingly sophisticated theoretical references. We need a committed reflection, open to criticism, which does not merely follow the current forms of academic research.

A critical examination of the 'agrarian dualism' approach shows us just how often the agrarian question is framed incorrectly. The superiority of large-scale production is said to rest mainly on the following foundations: large-scale agricultural production enables economies of scale; the replacement of labour by machinery leads to greater efficiency and higher productivity; and it therefore *ultimately* allows for better pay for workers. However, these assertions fail to consider the specific characteristics of agricultural activity, which is intrinsically linked to nature, climatic uncertainties and the diversity of ecosystems. Unlike in industry, economies of scale are by no means universal in agriculture; indeed, the opposite phenomenon — costs of scale — is often observed. Whilst mechanisation can increase labour productivity, it can lead to a decrease in land productivity – that is, in the production of net wealth per unit of area. Technology is not the neutral, natural and logical application of the results of scientific research. We must ask ourselves: who benefits from this supposed efficiency? The entrepreneur, the 'investor' or society as a whole?

Let us return to very simple matters, to questions of common sense. Let us begin by asking ourselves where wealth comes from, where 'added value' comes from. Billionaires today, in the 21st century, are not billions of times more productive than the poor. That is not where their efficiency lies. The mechanisms by which wealth is created and concentrated are, ultimately, quite simple. Wealth comes from labour, first and foremost. The concept of surplus value, first developed by Adam Smith and later taken up by Karl Marx, helps us understand that part of the product of labour can be appropriated by someone other than the worker, when the worker needs only a portion of the wealth he has created to reproduce his labour power. Kautsky points this out in a very instructive manner in 'The Agrarian Question'. But wealth can also come from nature, regardless of the labour invested, even though labour is always necessary to extract that wealth. We see this when we observe the differing outcomes of the same production system applied to different types of land, which David Ricardo theorised as 'differential rent'. This portion of wealth not produced by human labour has posed numerous problems for Marxists, but that is not our subject today.

Let us therefore ask ourselves how this added value, this wealth, is distributed – not amongst the 'factors' (land, labour, capital), a meaningless concept used by neo-liberal economists, but rather amongst the actors, individuals and social groups? What are the mechanisms behind this distribution? 'Contracts', accepted more or less freely? Direct violence? Multiple forms of institutionalised violence? In any case, it is the power relations between these different actors that enable us to understand what is really happening. Different normative and legal frameworks continue to coexist, and it is the balance of power that ultimately determines which ones are actually applied. This is precisely what makes the approach of 'legal pluralism' so interesting. (Merlet, 2011).

The quest for a better understanding faces numerous epistemological obstacles. We need to revisit concepts and question common assumptions that often prevent us from making progress. Let us mention a few, directly relevant to our subject.

The word **'capital'** is a striking example. It is used indiscriminately today [3]. Let us return to the classical economists and recognise that there is a fundamental difference between land and capital. Let us reinstate the concept of **'rent'**, the meaning of which we shall return to below.

Another word used in multiple senses is **'productivity'**, which is often confused with 'yield'. Even renowned scientists fall into this trap, such as the World Bank researchers in their 2011 study on the rush for agricultural land*, **Rising Global Interest in Farmland*,* unless they are deliberately creating the confusion (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011). A central part of their reasoning is based on *yield gaps* between actual and potential yields by region, without taking into account either inputs and machinery wear and tear, or mixed cropping systems and integrated crop-livestock farming. Whilst this certainly provides a justification for the appropriation of agricultural land deemed to be under-utilised, it does not reflect the reality.

'Property / Ownership' are other problematic terms. We must recognise the very recent and historically specific nature of the emergence of the word in the singular: 'absolute' property emerged at the time of the French Revolution, within a very particular political and social context, characterised by the bourgeoisie's desire to assert its power against the feudal lords (Comby, 2004). In fact, the general situation is one in which multiple and diverse property rights coexist, belonging to an equally diverse range of rights-holders of different kinds, whether individual or collective (Merlet, 2010). Here too, the implications for the appropriation of common resources are significant. The status of owner of a piece of land guarantees the owner's rights to all the wealth it contains, even that which has not yet been discovered.

These days, we're constantly hearing about 'businesses', 'entrepreneurs' and the 'private sector'. 'Business' is another magic word that lumps a small producer and a multinational together in the same "category". That doesn't really help us understand how things are changing!

'Investments' is a key trap word in the dominant discourse used to characterise recent agrarian dynamics. Investing is portrayed as nothing but beneficial, and the current problems facing global agriculture are said to stem from a lack of investment in the sector over several decades. But these 'investments' are often very meagre, and in fact conceal mechanisms of dispossession and the appropriation of common resources (Merlet, 2013).

The **'responsibility'** invoked, for example, in the search for 'responsible agricultural investment' shifts the focus to the realm of morality (Merlet *et al.*, 2014). This is another key concept in the imposition of a narrative that appears to be based on respect for human rights, but which in fact dissolves democracy into the mere goodwill of companies. This is extremely serious. Expecting large corporations, such as Pepsi-Cola and Coca-Cola, to apply the Committee on World Food Security's voluntary guidelines on land governance with their suppliers is undoubtedly not the best way to strengthen global democracy.

In order to restart the debate on the merits of large-scale production versus small-scale production on a sound footing, we must broaden our scope of observation. There can be no *latifundium* without *minifundium*, just as there would be no rich people if there were no poor people, as Polanyi reminds us in *'The Great Transformation',* in a fascinating chapter on the treatment of the poor.

At the local level, analyses of agrarian systems enable us to compare the economic efficiency of large and small farms within the same region. The results often surprise those who are not familiar with agriculture. Small farms are usually much more efficient in terms of net productivity per hectare than large farms [4]. To complement these analyses, which rely primarily on the selling prices of products at the point of exit from the production unit, it is necessary to carry out supply chain analyses, which help us understand how added value is distributed along these chains. We need to consider

[3] / For example, Thomas Piketty, in his famous book 'Le Capital au XXIe siècle' (2013, Éditions du Seuil, Paris), provides a very interesting statistical description of the concentration of wealth in the hands of a minority, but his failure to define capital and his characterisation of the equations of capitalism are by no means convincing!

employment on a different scale from that of the enterprise and be able to take externalities into account. Can large agricultural enterprises with high labour productivity, set against a backdrop of widespread unemployment, be socially viable? Sooner or later, such situations lead to explosive outcomes.

On a more global level, it must be borne in mind that production units with extremely different net labour productivities are competing in the globalised market, with ratios now far exceeding 1 to 500 (Mazoyer, 2001). Yet the price of a good is determined by labour productivity. Even though the proportion of cereals traded on the world market is very small compared with total production, their price is determined solely by the productivity of exporting firms. It tends to fall structurally when labour productivity rises more in this sector than in the economy as a whole. This downward trend in agricultural prices has direct repercussions on purchasing power and on the survival of all producers, even those who market only a small proportion of their output (Mazoyer, 2001). Globalised market mechanisms thus lead to the disappearance of small-scale farming far beyond the producers directly affected by the expansion of large-scale production and land grabs. The development of gigantic agricultural conglomerates in Ukraine will lead to the ruin of smaller-scale producers in other parts of the world, without the latter ever even having been aware of their existence.

In summary, we could say that it is all a question of distribution. The market can optimally redistribute real commodities—those produced for trade—under certain conditions (competition, etc.), which are not always easy to fulfil. But the market cannot, and will never be able to, optimally redistribute fictitious commodities, particularly land, labour and money. The economy is always deeply embedded in society. Yet today we act as if this were not the case. We treat it as a sphere in its own right, having nothing to do with the social or the political, which is a nonsensical position. But questioning the 'market society' does not mean establishing a society without markets (Polanyi, 1983). Socialist economies have illustrated the risks involved. But a society governed entirely by the market – whether we call it a 'capitalist society' or, as Polanyi does, a 'market society' – proves to be utterly incompatible with the overall interests of humanity. We must develop societies that regulate all the markets which cannot regulate themselves.

Today, it is also all about the appropriation of rents – wealth not produced by labour. Let us examine how wealth and value added are distributed amongst landowners, capital owners, workers and society as a whole. Numerous studies carried out in recent years by students from the Chair of Comparative Agriculture at AgroParisTech, and by AGTER interns in Ukraine, Peru, Nicaragua and Romania, have highlighted the inequality of this distribution. Thus, in Ukraine, within the largest agro-holdings studied, 80 to 90 per cent of value added goes towards remunerating capital owners, with the remaining 10 to 20 per cent divided between remuneration for landowners — who benefited from the land reform following the collapse of the Soviet Union — and workers, and meagre tax payments to the state (Cochet and Merlet, 2011). [5] These patterns speak volumes about the efficiency of large-scale capitalist agricultural production. One of the leading French investors in Ukrainian agriculture, Mr Charles Beigbeder, explained on television a few years ago that companies like his would feed the world. In fact, his companies were taking advantage of a specific situation arising from the de-collectivisation in Ukraine to make substantial profits – far greater than those ordinary capitalists could achieve elsewhere – with the complicity of the French and Ukrainian governments, which had signed a bilateral investment treaty.

To this end, we need to be able to identify the different types of rent: land rent, but also rent created by public policies, rent linked to specific legal provisions, and any other type of income not linked to labour. We need to find out who actually reaps these benefits! We are all familiar with the rents established by the Common Agricultural Policy. There are others, such as those arising from the obligation to incorporate a certain percentage of biofuels into fuels sold to the public, which drive up demand for and the price of this

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[4] / For further information, see the studies on Ukraine, Peru, Nicaragua and Romania available on the AGTER resource website, which help to answer the question: How to create more net wealth and employment per unit of area. http://www.agter.org/bdf/fr/thesaurus_defi/motcle-defi-6.html#Onglet_Question_9

[5] / For further details, see Jaubertie C., Pardon L., Cochet H. and Levesque R. (2010). Ukraine: a comparative analysis of the economic dynamics and performance of agricultural structures. Available in French. Ukraine: une approche comparée des dynamiques et performances économiques des structures agricoles. Ministère de l'Agriculture (France). Centre d'études et de prospective. Service de la statistique et de la prospective NESE, No. 34, Déc. 2010, pp. 37–55.

type of product. Classifying an area as buildable in a land-use plan will also automatically lead to a rise in the price of land within that area.

Based on the many observations we have made, it is legitimate to ask whether the true advantage of largescale production is not, in fact, its ability to appropriate rents?

We must attempt to explain the dynamics at play. The economic and social behaviours of the various actors differ: there is little in common between the logic of family-based peasant production and reproduction and the logic of the capitalist economy. Hervieu and Purseigle provide a detailed typology at the end of a very interesting book in which they describe the coexistence of multiple forms of large-scale and small-scale production, including family farming, corporate farming and subsistence farming. Although they have all the information to do so, they do not emphasise the dynamics that give rise to these different types and 'deduce' that there is room for all of them, and that the coexistence of large-scale and small-scale production should be organised (Hervieu and Purseigle, 2013). We know that there are relationships between large-scale and small-scale production: we have discussed the mechanisms of price-setting in liberalised markets, due to differences in labour productivity; we must also recall the interrelationships surrounding the labour force and its reproduction – already very much present in the relations between *latifundia* and *minifundia* – as well as the links forged around processing and marketing chains, and so on. Many other researchers note the 'coexistence' of various forms of agricultural production without sufficiently explaining the links between them. This choice is political and largely misleading. Small-scale and largescale production form a single system, and the development of one almost always poses a threat to the other (Merlet, 2012). The subsistence farming referred to by Hervieu and Purseigle bears no resemblance to the peasant farming of yesteryear; it comprises people who have been impoverished and who constitute a vast reserve army for corporate agriculture. Furthermore, when family farming becomes corporate farming, it changes in nature and begins to operate like a business. There is therefore not enough room for everyone, and the way in which large-scale and small-scale production coexist does not allow for the achievement of either a social optimum (employment, production) or an environmental optimum for humanity.

III – What can be done to avoid heading towards a new global disaster?

Let us return to Kautsky. His argument is clear and convincing, but it is mistaken. One might well ask what role this conception played, and to what extent the policies it inspired contributed to the historical failure of real socialism. Moreover, these were undoubtedly not mere errors, but rather positions that served the interests of certain social groups. I witnessed this first-hand in Nicaragua in the 1980s.

The final chapter of the second part of Kautsky's book is entitled 'How to neutralise the peasants'. That speaks volumes! For nineteenth-century socialists, the peasant was a backward person and a potential political enemy. He was not treated as a direct political enemy, but the strategy of social democracy was to ensure that he did not rise up, and to ensure that he could disappear without suffering too much. It seems to me that this strategy was partly responsible for the failure of the socialist project and that it is high time to start building another project, one that stands a chance of succeeding.

Many other important aspects, which I can only touch upon here, would merit in-depth discussion. The growth of fictitious capital and the nature of the current financial system allow for a considerable increase in the appropriation of rents and natural resources. It is now possible to buy land or resources, or to take control of them, by borrowing the necessary capital from major banks or using profits made through speculation on the financial markets. As it is possible to lose these fortunes on these markets just as quickly as they were made, it is advisable to convert them into something tangible by investing, for example, in large-scale farms in Brazil or elsewhere. The result is a wave of primitive accumulation and dispossession on an unprecedented scale. And whilst capital is, by definition, mobile, the phenomena of dispossession and the destruction of small-scale farming are irreversible in the short and medium term.

What does the dominance of the 'Doing Business' mindset, the glorification of 'win-win' agreements, the promotion of corporate social responsibility and business plans presented as the solution for small-scale producers have in store for us? A world in which more than half the population would be unemployed, natural resources would have been destroyed, and growing inequality would lead to ever more conflict and ever more violence.

We must put business back in its place and prioritise the public interest. We need to return to the basics of economics, distinguishing between the interests of the entrepreneur or the so-called 'investor' and those of society as a whole. The tools exist. They were used a few decades ago (the 'effects' method developed mainly in France, the 'reference price' method or the cost-benefit analysis of the World Bank). They have been replaced by socio-environmental impact assessments, which measure negative effects, attempt to mitigate them or artificially compensate for the losses incurred, whilst refusing to examine other options or models apart from those presented by investors – such as those based on the development of smallholder farming.

Certain funders [including the International Finance Corporation (World Bank) and Proparco (AFD)] justify multi-million funding for the development of a bioethanol sector in Central America by the region's largest sugarcane producers, arguing that this project will create jobs and help combat climate change [6]. However, if we compare the number of jobs created by such a sugarcane plantation system and its associated agroindustry with those in neighbouring smallholder farming systems, we find that the latter employ between 3 and 22 times more people per hectare than the sugarcane plantations (Jahel, 2014). Admittedly, the project to develop the bioethanol sector does create a few dozen new jobs, compared with the situation on the sugar plantations as set out in the preliminary proposal. But this serves to bolster large-scale sugar production, whilst refusing to examine the potential of another approach: that of supporting an alternative smallholder model. The method employed does not allow us to move beyond a development project based exclusively on large capitalist enterprises with salaried employees.

These are the key issues in research on agrarian dualism.

With this very general overview, I have sought to highlight the fundamental issues underlying the seminar's themes, not only in Mediterranean countries but throughout the world. With the drafting of the Voluntary Guidelines on Land Governance by the United Nations Committee on World Food Security in 2012, the signatory countries and civil society took a first step in the right direction, but this is still only a tiny step for humanity. Indeed, the challenge now lies in putting them into practice, and this does not seem straightforward, as the balance of power has not really shifted. The signatory countries have not committed to amending their national legislation; indeed, the guidelines even specify that they are to be implemented in accordance with that legislation. The equally non-binding agreement that followed on the principles for responsible agricultural investment marks a clear step backwards, even though it claims to be based on the Voluntary Guidelines (Merlet *et al.,* 2014).

Researchers bear a great responsibility: to examine reality by closely observing current developments, and to constantly question their analytical tools, deconstructing the categories of analysis that serve only to justify the practices of certain groups of actors.

I hope that this very brief overview of the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of large-scale and small-scale agricultural production will lead to questions that will be taken up by the researchers at this seminar.

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[6] / The financial organisation's website states that 'PROPARCO's support for Pantaleón Sugar forms part of its mandate in Latin America, which is to support green and inclusive growth.' PROPARCO contributed $14 million to Pantaleón's investment programme for the period 2008–2010 (totalling $130 million).

See: www.proparco.fr/Accueil_PROPARCO/notre-action/PageCacheeAnte2011/Tous-les-projets/Guatemala-2009Agro-et-cogeneration-Pantaleon. Last Access in April 2016. Now inaccessible.

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